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One Third of the U.S. Navy Operating In and Around the Persian Gulf Near Iran, with Two Aircraft Carriers and Air Reinforcements, Rekindles Comparisons to 1991 and 2003 and Raises the Question No One Wants to Ask Out Loud

Written by Bruno Teles
Published on 17/02/2026 at 18:11
Updated on 17/02/2026 at 18:14
Marinha dos Estados Unidos concentra forças no Golfo Pérsico perto do Irã, com porta-aviões e o estreito de Ormuz no centro da tensão, reacendendo comparações com 1991 e 2003 e dúvidas sobre o que vem em 2026.
Marinha dos Estados Unidos concentra forças no Golfo Pérsico perto do Irã, com porta-aviões e o estreito de Ormuz no centro da tensão, reacendendo comparações com 1991 e 2003 e dúvidas sobre o que vem em 2026.
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Open Source Intelligence Reports Indicate That The U.S. Navy Concentrated About One Third Of Its Deployed Ships In The Persian Gulf Near Iran, Including Two Aircraft Carriers And Escorts, With Air Reinforcement And The Strait Of Hormuz As A Bottleneck, For Weeks If Diplomacy Fails Today

The movement attributed to open source analysis has rekindled a type of unease both inside and outside the Persian Gulf that often appears before major crises. When the U.S. Navy assembles groups of aircraft carriers and increases its air package around Iran, the debate ceases to be abstract, even for those who do not follow the topic.

There’s one detail that makes the situation particularly sensitive: the Strait of Hormuz is not just a line on the map, but a chokepoint of global oil trade. Just one incident there can turn a regional crisis into inflation and ripple instability, and that’s why numbers and dates gain political weight.

The Build-Up Of Forces In 2026 And What Has Been Confirmed

U.S. Navy Concentrates Forces In The Persian Gulf Near Iran, With Aircraft Carriers And The Strait Of Hormuz At The Center Of Tension, Rekindling Comparisons With 1991 And 2003 And Questions About What Comes In 2026.

On Monday, February 16, open source intelligence analysts indicated that about 1/3 of the currently deployed U.S. Navy ships were operating in or around the Persian Gulf, in areas near Iran.

The central reading is simple: this is not merely a symbolic presence, but a critical mass to sustain military options.

At the end of January, an aircraft carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln, accompanied by destroyers, cruisers, and submarines, was already operating in the area of U.S. Central Command.

On February 13, the Pentagon confirmed that a second aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, would leave the Caribbean Sea for the same theater, increasing to two nuclear carriers and close to two dozen escorts.

Two aircraft carriers are not a neutral gesture; they are a mobile combat infrastructure.

Why The Strait Of Hormuz Pulls Ships Like A Magnet

U.S. Navy Concentrates Forces In The Persian Gulf Near Iran, With Aircraft Carriers And The Strait Of Hormuz At The Center Of Tension, Rekindling Comparisons With 1991 And 2003 And Questions About What Comes In 2026.

The most cited reason for the concentration of the U.S. Navy near Iran is geographical, and it is also economic.

The Strait of Hormuz is described as the most important chokepoint for the world’s oil transit, through which more than one-fifth of what is consumed on the planet passes. When that enters the calculation, any crisis ceases to be local.

The reasoning behind the fear of escalation is condensed in a single example: a shot from an Iranian anti-ship missile at an oil tanker could interrupt about 20% of global oil flow.

It’s the math of risk, not rhetoric, and it explains why the Persian Gulf fills with American warships whenever Tehran becomes the center of a crisis.

The Comparisons With 1991 And 2003 And The Difference That Changes Everything

The references to 1991 and 2003 resurface because, in both cases, there was a pattern of pre-war at sea, with aircraft carriers projecting air power and submarines or escorts armed with cruise missiles.

In 1991, during the Gulf War, the deployment was massive: more than 165 ships, including six aircraft carrier groups, and the embarked aviation conducted approximately 20,000 sorties during the main period of the air conflict.

In 2003, during the invasion of Iraq, the naval component was also significant, totaling five aircraft carrier strike groups and about 150 U.S. and coalition ships.

There was also the weight of Tomahawk cruise missiles, with 381 launched on just the first night and close to 1,000 throughout the campaign.

What makes the parallel work is maritime logic; what prevents the equivalence is the absence, so far, of the massive land buildup.

What The U.S. Navy Can Do Without A Ground Invasion

The plan described for 2026 is more compatible with an air and missile campaign sustained from the sea and regional bases, something that, in theory, allows for punishment and degradation, but not necessarily an occupation.

The U.S. Navy, by combining embarked aviation, submarines, and escorts with launch capabilities, gains the ability to attack in layers, first degrading defenses, then hitting military infrastructure and command nodes, and then maintaining pressure with recurrent attacks.

This model often comes accompanied by observation and surveillance means, drones, reconnaissance aircraft, and tanker planes, as well as electronic warfare resources to hinder sensors and coordination from Iran.

When someone prepares to operate for weeks, the message is that there is an operational option ready, even if diplomacy remains in dispute.

Oil, Mines, And Politics: What Could Ignite The Persian Gulf

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If the chokepoint is the Strait of Hormuz, a recurring threat comes back to the debate: the possibility of Iranian mines as a strategic tool.

The naval presence of the U.S. Navy also works, in this reading, as an attempt to keep the Strait of Hormuz free and unobstructed, reducing the risk of a global oil crisis.

At the same time, the political context taints any analysis. The report that the Trump administration views regime change as a desire appears as a backdrop, but what is observed, in this snapshot, is a smaller apparatus than in 1991 and 2003 and without clear signs of total invasion.

The question that remains is not whether there is attack capability, but what the acceptable objective is and what cost would be tolerated.

What is visible today is a combination of signals: two aircraft carriers, escorts, air reinforcement, and the concentration of a significant portion of the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf near Iran, with the Strait of Hormuz as a factor that transforms any shock into a global problem.

Still, what separates 2026 from 1991 and 2003 is what does not appear: the land buildup on a scale for occupation.

If you have followed any international crisis up close, what detail usually convinces you that the escalation is real: the presence of aircraft carriers, political rhetoric, movement in the Strait of Hormuz, or the lack of ground forces? And, looking at the Persian Gulf and Iran, which of these signals would you take more seriously now?

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Bruno Teles

Falo sobre tecnologia, inovação, petróleo e gás. Atualizo diariamente sobre oportunidades no mercado brasileiro. Com mais de 7.000 artigos publicados nos sites CPG, Naval Porto Estaleiro, Mineração Brasil e Obras Construção Civil. Sugestão de pauta? Manda no brunotelesredator@gmail.com

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