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Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Are Advancing in Brazil. PCC and Comando Vermelho Expand Power and Challenge the State.
Brazil is experiencing a critical moment in its recent history, with the accelerated growth of organized crime and drug trafficking.
In 2025, cases such as the murder of a former delegate in São Paulo, the death of a PCC informant in Guarulhos, and the gang war in Ceará reignited the debate on the extent to which the country is being dominated by criminal organizations such as the First Command of the Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV).
The territorial and economic expansion of these factions raises the question: is Brazil becoming a narco-state?
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Researchers claim that the term is exaggerated but acknowledge a concerning advance of criminality and an increasingly symbiotic relationship between factions and local power structures.
Experts Reject the Term “Narco-State,” but See Advancement of Crime
According to the American researcher Benjamin Lessing, an expert in organized crime in Latin America, the concept of a narco-state would only apply to countries where the state directly participates in drug trafficking — something that does not happen in Brazil.
“It’s hard to find a real example of a narco-state. Perhaps Panama in the 1980s, with Manuel Noriega, or Venezuela if military involvement in trafficking is proven,” Lessing states.
Even so, he emphasizes that Brazil leads in Latin America in the number of people living under the control of factions.
Estimates indicate that between 50 and 60 million Brazilians reside in areas controlled by organized crime — a number higher than that of countries like Colombia and Mexico.
PCC and Comando Vermelho Dominate Territories and Diversify Businesses
Brazilian factions have transformed into true crime conglomerates.
According to the Brazilian Forum on Public Security (FBSP), the revenue of criminal organizations already exceeds R$ 348 billion per year, with drug trafficking representing only 4% of this total.
In addition to drug trafficking, the factions engage in cybercrime, illegal fintechs, cell phone theft, and even legal markets initially used for money laundering. Cyber crimes alone generate R$ 186 billion annually.
The PCC, for example, has evolved from a prison organization into a business structure, even having a presence in the financial market of Faria Lima.
“The PCC has been accumulating a lot of capital and internationalizing, which has led to new ways of operation,” explains sociologist Eduardo Dyna from the Federal University of São Carlos (UFSCar).
The Duopoly of Violence: State and Factions Side by Side
For researcher Gabriel Feltran, director of CNRS and professor at Sciences Po, Brazil is experiencing a “duopoly of violence,” in which the state and organized crime share power over territories.
“In Brazil, multiple sovereign entities coexist. The state does not have a monopoly on force or justice, but this does not mean we live in a narco-state,” says Feltran, author of the book Brothers: A History of the PCC.
This coexistence reflects a scenario where the state maintains a repressive presence but is absent in providing basic services like education and health — a void quickly filled by factions, churches, or militias.
Political Infiltration and Interconnected Criminal Networks
The Comando Vermelho and PCC have expanded their influence beyond drug trafficking. Research indicates that organized crime is already active in illegal mining, timber extraction, public transportation, waste collection, and even in funding political campaigns.
Sociologist Rodrigo Ghiringhelli de Azevedo from PUC-RS defines the phenomenon as a “diffused narco-state,” where there is cooptation of public agents and infiltration into the local political system, especially in areas dominated by trafficking in Rio de Janeiro.
“These illicit markets have been connecting, increasing the power and influence of factions in various sectors,” explains Azevedo.
Incarceration and State Failures Expand the Power of Factions
The origin of this crisis dates back to Brazilian prisons. It was there that PCC was born in 1993 and Comando Vermelho in the 1970s.
The policy of mass incarceration and the transfer of leaders between states allowed for the interchange and expansion of factions.
“The state itself helped spread the factions. The prison system became a school for crime,” asserts Lessing.
Currently, according to the Ministry of Justice, there are 88 active criminal organizations in the country, controlling territories where 31 million Brazilians live — a number that grows year after year.
The Danger of Rhetoric and the Challenge of Regaining Territory
Experts warn against the political use of the term “narco-state.” Sociologist Sérgio Adorno from USP states that expressions like “narcoterrorism” and “war on drugs” distort the debate and can justify dangerous military actions.
“When you call this terrorism, you turn a public security issue into a national defense problem, which is risky,” says Adorno.
Meanwhile, the state continues without a clear strategy to regain territories controlled by factions.
The operation that killed 121 people in the Penha and Alemão complexes is viewed by experts as an example of force without planning — yet another symptom of a country where organized crime and drug trafficking continue to advance, and Brazil struggles to avoid becoming a hostage to its own system.
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