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While The Taliban Consolidates Control Since 2021, The Regime Accelerates A Huge Artificial Canal, Reopens Strategic Tunnel And Signs Memorandums With China To Monetize Trillion-Dollar Mineral Reserves, Promising Jobs, Energy And Irrigation In An Afghanistan Still Marked By Poverty, Sanctions And Permanent Diplomatic Isolation In The Eyes Of The World
Since August 2021, when the Taliban regained power in Kabul, the country has entered a new phase of projects announced as “historic.” Between 2023 and 2025, the regime put a huge artificial canal in the north, the reconstruction of a historically tragic mountain tunnel, and a series of preliminary agreements with Asian partners at the center of its internal narrative.
In 2025, this strategy gained clearer contours: the Taliban attempts to sell the world the image of an Afghanistan capable of breaking free from international aid dependence by using trillions of dollars in untapped minerals. The combination of mega-projects, promises of irrigation, energy, and heavy mining is presented as a way to transform a poor country into a platform for money and regional power.
Artificial Canal In The North Becomes Showcase Of Taliban’s Hydraulic Ambition
At the center of this plan is a huge artificial canal in northern Afghanistan, promoted by the Taliban as the largest project of its kind in Asia.
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The route cuts through traditionally arid regions and aims to divert water from a major river to nourish agricultural areas and, in theory, make productive zones currently dependent on irregular rainfall.
For the Taliban, the project is proof that the regime can deliver heavy infrastructure without depending on Western bodies.
Government-affiliated technicians repeat that the canal can irrigate hundreds of thousands of hectares and reduce food insecurity, although they do not present, with the same transparency, comprehensive studies on the impact of water flow on downstream neighboring countries.
Independent experts, both inside and outside the country, warn that a canal of this scale, operated by an isolated government with few oversight mechanisms, could generate water disputes with neighbors, environmental imbalances, and concentration of benefits among groups linked to the Taliban itself.
The lack of reliable public data on diverted volumes, real timelines, and total costs increases doubts surrounding the project.
Qosh Tepa Canal, The Taliban’s Ambition And Cascading Effects On Regional Water
The canal that the Taliban has turned into an infrastructure showcase has a defined name and scope: Qosh Tepa.
Planned to be about 285 kilometers long in northern Afghanistan, it began to be excavated shortly after the group’s return to power in 2021 and already has approximately half of the route executed, with a full operational goal by 2028.
The official promise is that Qosh Tepa will divert up to 10 cubic kilometers of water per year from the Amu Darya river, about a third of the total flow, to irrigate currently dry agricultural areas and reduce dependence on wheat, legumes, fruits, and other staple food imports.
The Taliban sells the canal as a solution for a country where agriculture employs most of the population but struggles with water shortages even for domestic consumption in several districts.
The regime also links Qosh Tepa to a long-term strategy to cut the economy’s dependence on opium.
Before the Taliban‘s return, it is estimated that drug trafficking represented a significant portion of GDP, in part because the poppy requires much less water than food crops.
The official narrative now is that, by ensuring irrigation, the canal will convince farmers to abandon poppy in favor of legal crops with government support.
Water Crisis In Central Asia And Tensions Fuelled By The Taliban’s Canal
The issue is that Qosh Tepa does not exist in a vacuum.
The Amu Darya already supplies Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, countries facing increasing water scarcity for both irrigation and human consumption.
By abruptly inserting Afghanistan into the competition for the same river, the Taliban’s project threatens to destabilize a water balance that was already fragile.
Throughout Central Asia, the combination of population growth, urbanization, industry, and intensive cotton irrigation pressures rivers and aquifers.
One kilogram of cotton fiber can require tens of thousands of liters of water, and this model was one of the causes of the Aral Sea collapse.
The region has already seen street protests due to lack of water, “water wars” at borders, and even armed clashes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2021, all symptoms of a water system at its limit.
In this context, the Taliban’s canal adds a new relevant consumer to a river that many already consider overloaded.
Countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, major cotton irrigators, fear losing part of the volume that feeds their agricultural systems, while Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan also face episodes of scarcity that force residents to buy water in containers or rely on water trucks during severe droughts.
At the same time, Afghanistan argues that it has the right to use the Amu Darya: about 30% of the flow originates in its territory and, historically, the country has used a minimal fraction of the water compared to its neighbors.
For the Taliban, Qosh Tepa is a correction of a “historical injustice”; for downstream countries, it is a potential trigger for political, economic, and ecological conflict.
Right To Water, Coordination Failures, And Risks Of Structural Accidents
From a legal standpoint, no country in the region denies that Afghanistan, now controlled by the Taliban, has the right to exploit part of the waters of the Amu Darya.
The central concern lies in the absence of a modern sharing agreement, the lack of regional coordination, and the technical quality of the work.
The canal, in large parts of its route, lacks adequate lining, which increases loss through infiltration in sandy soil and poses a risk of ruptures.
Shortly after the opening of the first segment, in 2023, a section of the bank collapsed, flooding the surrounding area and forming an artificial lake of over 30 square kilometers.
The authorities linked to the Taliban have not publicly acknowledged the accident, which raised alarms about transparency, monitoring, and the ability to respond to potential future failures, especially in a structure that aims to divert massive volumes of water.
Despite not officially recognizing the Taliban government, neighboring countries try to maintain informal channels with Kabul.
Taliban representatives are welcomed as guests at regional conferences in hopes of involving them in joint decisions on water, energy, and infrastructure, while Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan invest in electrical projects and pipelines within Afghan territory.
So far, however, this has not changed the regime’s stance on the canal, treated as a strictly domestic issue.
The combination of a water project of this scale, lack of a shared use agreement, climate crisis, and aging infrastructure in Central Asia pushes the situation toward some form of shock by inertia.
The central question is whether the Taliban and its neighbors will manage to turn Qosh Tepa into a point of cooperation and modernization or if the canal will end up being remembered as a trigger for a regional crisis of water, security, and political legitimacy.
Reconstruction Of Deadly Tunnel In Strategic Mountain Corridor
Another pillar of the Taliban’s infrastructure narrative is the reconstruction of a vital mountain tunnel for connecting the north and south of the country, often described as “giant” and with a history of fatal accidents over decades of use.
This corridor is crucial for the transportation of goods, fuel, and food during the harsh winter.
The regime’s version is that the new structure will be safer, more ventilated, and monitored, correcting accumulated technical flaws and reducing the risk of fires, pile-ups, and mass fatalities recorded in the past.
By releasing images of construction, structural reinforcements, and equipment, the Taliban attempts to demonstrate the capacity to manage a high-risk asset.
Critics remind that, without clear international safety protocols, independent technical audits, and transparency regarding materials and emergency systems, the reconstructed tunnel may continue to be a point of vulnerability, especially in a country with a history of irregular maintenance and slow disaster response in remote areas.
Taliban, China And The Geopolitical Use Of Infrastructure
In parallel with internal works, the Taliban seeks closeness to China to try to break its diplomatic isolation.
The strategy involves memorandums on infrastructure, mining, and possible inclusion of sections of Afghan territory in logistical corridors linked to Chinese regional projects.
The discourse emphasizes that Afghanistan can become a link between Central Asia, South Asia, and the rest of the continent.
On the Chinese side, the declared interest is in accessing shorter routes and strategic mineral reserves, while weighing the risk of instability and the lack of formal international recognition of the Taliban government.
Neither party discloses all the details of the signed commitments, which fuels speculation about future mining concessions, tolls on roads, and participation in energy and logistics profits.
For the Taliban, any rapprochement with a global power serves as an internal legitimacy argument.
The regime seeks to show that, even under sanctions and without formal recognition from various countries, it can attract foreign capital and technology, especially in exchange for privileged access to Afghanistan’s natural resources.
Trillions In Minerals Between Promise And Economic Reality
Long before the Taliban‘s return to power, international studies had already estimated that Afghanistan’s subsoil could contain trillions of dollars in strategic minerals, including copper, iron, lithium, and rare earth elements.
Since 2021, the regime began to cite these estimates as the basis for a narrative of “wealthy future” financed by mining.
In practice, turning this promise into revenue depends on factors that go beyond the physical possession of the mineral.
Large-scale mining requires stable energy, roads, railways, transmission lines, security for technicians and investors, and minimal contract and arbitration rules.
In an environment with sanctions, banking restrictions, and doubts about commitment adherence, many potential partners remain cautious.
There is also the risk that mineral exploitation will concentrate income in circles close to Taliban leadership, reproduce corruption schemes already seen in other resource-rich countries, and leave local communities with little more than environmental degradation and forced displacements.
Without transparency and revenue-sharing mechanisms, the “wealth of the subsoil” may never translate into widespread improvement in social indicators.
Infrastructure, Internal Control And Human Cost
Projects like the artificial canal and the rebuilt tunnel also serve, for the Taliban, as instruments of political control.
By deciding where water will reach, which regions will be connected by roads, and who will receive jobs in works and contracts, the regime strengthens ties with allies and marginalizes areas considered hostile.
Human rights organizations point out that investments in concrete and steel go hand in hand with restrictions on civil liberties, closure of spaces for women and girls in education, and severe limitations on the press and civil society.
Building an image of “Afghanistan under construction” coexists with systematic violations allegations, making it more challenging for democratic governments to justify any direct economic rapprochement.
In the long run, the central question is whether the Taliban‘s bet on mega-projects, mining, and selective agreements will be sufficient to reduce poverty and external dependence or if it will only create a new layer of elites linked to the regime, leaving the majority of the population in a vulnerable situation.
Given this scenario of giant canals, reconstructed tunnels, and the race for minerals, in your assessment, is the Taliban really paving an economic future for Afghanistan, or is it just using large works as a showcase while the population remains trapped in poverty and lack of rights?
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You’re a 100% right. The Taliban will live like the African leaders, for life, live, while the population will go on scrounging for crumbs. Africa, unlike Afghanistan, has its minerals and natural resources reachable, but the Taliban have yet to make tracks to their hidden wealth