Portuguese 
Senate Approves National Policy on Critical Minerals with Up to R$ 7 Billion in Incentives, Establishes R$ 2 Billion Guarantee Fund, and Creates a Presidential Advisory Council
The vote took place on September 2. The rapporteur was Senator Eduardo Braga from the MDB party in Amazonas, and the approved text retained what was passed by the Chamber of Deputies in May, with only minor editorial adjustments.
According to the Senate Agency, the PL 2.780/2024 establishes four structures at once, which is where the real content of the proposal lies.
What the Law Creates
The first structure is the national policy itself, the PNMCE, which provides a legal framework for the topic and defines what the state considers critical or strategic minerals.
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The second is the Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund, or FGAM, which receives R$ 2 billion from the federal government. A guarantee fund does not provide direct financing; it covers risks, allowing banks to lend to projects that would not otherwise qualify for credit.
The third is the CIMCE, the National Council for the Industrialization of Critical and Strategic Minerals, linked directly to the Presidency of the Republic. Its position in the organizational chart is significant; a council connected to the Presidency can traverse ministries rather than depending solely on one.
The fourth is the Low Carbon Mineral Certificate, an instrument that certifies the emission footprint of production. This exists because the European and Asian buyers of critical minerals demand tracking when securing contracts.
How the R$ 7 Billion is Divided
The total amount announced is not a single check. It is divided into two distinct allocations.
There are R$ 2 billion for the guarantee fund and R$ 5 billion aimed at mineral processing and transformation. This second portion reveals the project’s central intention.
Currently, Brazil exports ore and imports products made from it. Extraction adds the least value in the chain; processing, transforming, and industrializing are where the money lies. Allocating five of the seven billion to this end is a clear choice.
There is also a mechanism for contribution from the sector itself. For six years, 0.2% of gross operating revenue will go to the guarantee fund and 0.3% for research and technological development.
After this period, the percentage allocated to the fund can be redirected to research, totaling 0.5% invested in knowledge. This structure substitutes initial capitalization for long-term technical capacity.
Urban Mining and the Research Clock
Two points in the text often go unnoticed and deserve highlighting. The first is urban mining.
The proposal addresses the recovery of strategic components from electronic waste, discarded batteries, end-of-life vehicles, and construction debris. An old cellphone contains metals that are also extracted from mines, and recovering them costs less than opening a new mine.
The second point is a deadline: the authorization for mineral research will have a non-extendable maximum limit of ten years. Currently, it is common for an area to be stalled due to successive extensions, with the holder not conducting actual research or relinquishing the rights.
This type of limitation is what prevents a potentially lucrative area from reaching investors. Imposing a hard limit necessitates a decision: either the area is researched and results are presented, or it is released.
The legislation also includes auction regulations for areas with potential for critical minerals and the establishment of a national network for research, technological development, and professional training.
From this perspective, what has been approved is more about institutional architecture than actual funding. Councils, funds, certificates, and deadlines are elements that only function if the regulations are enacted swiftly and effectively.
This is precisely where the risk lies. A law creating a council tied to the Presidency and a billion-dollar fund depends on decrees, appointments, and definitively allocated budgets to be implemented, and this cannot be resolved by a symbolic vote.
It is also important to explain why these minerals have gained the label of critical. This classification does not stem from geological rarity but from the combination of essential use in technology and the concentration of supply in a few countries.
Lithium, cobalt, graphite, niobium, rare earth elements, and copper are included in this list because they support batteries, electric motors, wind turbines, semiconductors, and defense equipment. Without them, there can be no energy transition or high-tech industry.
Brazil occupies an unusual position on this map. The country holds significant reserves of many of these minerals and is a global leader in niobium and graphite, but it exports most of them with minimal processing.
It is this asymmetry that the law attempts to rectify.
There is also a geopolitical component that is hard to ignore. The global processing of these minerals is concentrated in China, leading the United States and the European Union to seek alternative suppliers in recent years.
In this context, the Low Carbon Mineral Certificate ceases to be a bureaucratic detail. It is the document that allows Brazilian producers to compete for contracts with buyers who require environmental traceability, a requirement already stated in European regulations.
Furthermore, it is advisable to monitor what follows the sanctioning. According to the approved text, the council must be established, the fund must be capitalized, and the criteria for accessing incentives need regulation.
Thus, the gap between the law and the first funded project could be long. Next, it will be necessary to verify whether the projected budget translates into actual funding, a point where several Brazilian industrial policies have faced obstacles in the past.
Therefore, the indicator to observe is not the sanction itself. Over the coming months, what will determine if the policy works is the regulatory decree and the appointment of members to the council linked to the Presidency.
Will Brazil be able to stop being just an exporter of raw minerals, or will we repeat the history with lithium and rare earth elements?
