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A treaty signed in 1975 promised to transform Brazil into a nuclear power, but only one plant was implemented — and the problems continue to pile up to this day
On June 27, 1975, unexpected news surprised the Brazilian press. In Bonn, West Germany, authorities of the Brazilian military regime and representatives of the German government announced the signing of a nuclear agreement. The treaty provided for the construction of eight nuclear power plants in Brazil, divided between the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.
It was a bold plan, with technology transfer and the promise of placing the country among the world's nuclear powers.
A partnership surrounded by expectations
The proposal involved the power plants Angra 2, 3, 4 and 5, in Rio de Janeiro, and Iguapé 1, 2, 3 and 4, in São Paulo. Expectations were high. The agreement seemed advantageous for both countries.
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Germany was facing a severe economic crisis and was looking for markets for its nuclear industry. Brazil, under pressure from rising oil prices and with inflation close to 30%, wanted to diversify its energy matrix.
The German press called the treaty the “deal of the century.” It was estimated that Germany would receive around 10 billion dollars from exports of nuclear products to Brazil.
It was also a way for the two countries to escape dependence on the United States, which until then dominated the supply of nuclear technology in Latin America.
Only one plant completed in fifty years
Despite the initial enthusiasm, the practical result of the agreement was disappointing. Of the eight planned plants, only Angra 2 went into operation, in 2001.
Angra 3, which began in 1986, remains unfinished and has already cost more than R$20 billion. The others never got off the ground. Fifty years later, the treaty remains active, but is seen as an unfinished project.
Who made a mistake?
The question about the program's failure motivated a survey by the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG). Political scientists Dawisson Belém Lopes and João Paulo Nicolini published, in the journal Science and Public Policy, a study with interviews and documentary analysis. The article asks: “Whose fault is it that Brazil's nuclear program never matured?"
The researchers' response is clear. The biggest mistake was made by the Brazilian military administration itself. According to Nicolini, those responsible did not engage in dialogue with society, academia, or the private sector. There was a lack of planning and an excess of ambition.
"The biggest problem was the lack of dialogue with the academic community, the business community and society. We took a step too far and the lack of planning by the military led to this.”, He stated.
Context of the time
The treaty was signed during the government of General Ernesto Geisel, but researchers also point out flaws in the governments of Emilio Médici and João Figueiredo.
For both countries, the timing seemed ideal. Brazil was seeking energy autonomy. Germany needed to boost its industry and alleviate unemployment. In 1975, more than a million Germans were out of work.
Both governments also wanted to reduce their dependence on the United States. Germany had been barred from nuclear development after World War II. Brazil, in turn, had purchased the Angra 1 plant from the Americans on a turnkey basis, without technology transfer.
US Resistance
The United States did not approve the deal. There were fears that another Latin American nation would develop independent nuclear capability. There was pressure on suppliers.
Urenco, the company that was supposed to supply the equipment, was prevented from completing the sale. Brazil then received an experimental technology from Germany: the jet-nozzle. The system did not work well. The country was using more energy than it could generate.
South African example
Despite criticism, the Germans supplied this same technology to South Africa, which managed to develop nuclear warheads. For Brazilian researchers, the problem was not just the technology.
There was a lack of structure in Brazil. Without the participation of society and the innovation system, the country was unable to use what it learned for large-scale production.
Parallel program and nuclear submarine
Even so, some of the knowledge was reused. The parallel nuclear program emerged, kept secret until 1985. One of the results is the nuclear-powered submarine project.
Launched in partnership with France in 2009, the submarine should be ready in 2040. The current cost is around R$1 billion per year.
Lack of public debate
The authoritarian nature of the military regime was also decisive. As historian Helen Miranda Nunes explains, the lack of transparency prevented public debate. The press only reported the signing of the treaty on the day it took place. When the jet-nozzle technology was revealed, many scientists criticized the choice.
The historian points out that if Brazil had been a democracy at that time, the agreement might have gone ahead. Secrecy and the lack of public participation weakened the process. Part of the works were carried out by Odebrecht, without a public tender. The construction company had gained experience in government works, and its involvement raised suspicions in Operation Lava Jato years later.
"The choice of jet-nozzle technology was heavily criticized by nuclear scientists when it came to light. If we had been in a democracy at the time, it was possible that the agreement would not have taken off, because it was secret and took advantage of the deprivation of the population's rights.“, said Helen Miranda.
German companies were the biggest beneficiaries
According to experts, German companies have benefited most from the agreement. Kraftwerk Union, a subsidiary of Siemens, supplied the reactors and technology for Angra 2 and Angra 3.
German banks also lent money to Brazil. While environmental movements pushed against the use of nuclear energy in Germany, business flowed with the Brazilians.
Rafael Brandão, a professor at UERJ, recalls that Nuclep, a state-owned company created with the Germans, had final decisions in the hands of the German side. For him, there is no doubt: “Of course, the last word belonged to KWU-Siemens.. "
Accusations and impunity
Reports from the time already denounced irregularities. Jornal do Brasil published in 1979 that the inputs sold by KWU were overpriced. The magazine Der Spiegel also brought allegations of corruption. The pressure led to the creation of a CPI (Parliamentary Inquiry Commission) into the agreement, but nothing came of it.
Agreement remains in force
To this day, the treaty remains in place. Every five years, the German Parliament has the chance to revoke it. In 2024, there was another attempt, with pressure from the Green Party. Still, nothing has changed.
For Brazil, ending the agreement would mean abandoning Angra 3. According to Nicolini, this explains the permanence of the treaty: “The agreement is also alive because of our difficulty in completing what was planned. The blame lies with the inefficiency of Brazilian nuclear planning.".
Five decades later, what remains of the treaty is a scenario of unfinished works, high costs and frustrated expectations. The biggest mark of the so-called “deal of the century” is perhaps not technological advancement, but rather the portrait of poorly executed planning that still leaves its consequences today.
With information from DW.com.
