Portuguese 
English 
Spanish 
5 min of reading 
0 comments 
DFC Movement in Goiás Highlights Serra Verde and Aclara in the U.S. Strategy to Reduce Dependence on China, Ensuring Outflow of Brazilian Rare Earths and Moving Refining Abroad, While Brasília Still Negotiates Processing Rules and Counterparties Before Any Official Bilateral Agreement Between Governments.
Recently, DFC contracts with mining companies in Goiás have put Brazilian rare earths at the center of an industrial dispute that is advancing without a formal agreement between the Brazilian and U.S. governments. The financial architecture paves the way for U.S. buyers to have priority access to part of the production.
The package involves Serra Verde, the only active rare earths operation in the country, and Aclara, which is at an advanced project stage in northern Goiás. The agreements include loans with the possibility of conversion to equity and, in Aclara’s case, the announcement in October of a refinery in the United States by 2028, shifting added value out of Brazil.
Why DFC Entered Rare Earths
The DFC (Development Finance Corporation) is a U.S. government-owned bank that finances projects outside the U.S. and states that its investments seek to counterbalance Chinese influence in strategic supply chains.
-
China surprises the world with the discovery of a “supergiant” deposit valued at US$ 85.9 billion, containing over 1,000 tons of gold at a depth of 2,000 meters and an impressive concentration of 138 grams per ton of rock.
-
BRL 9 billion, 12.5 million tons per year, and operation until 2041: MRN receives Ibama license to open new bauxite mines in Pará and maintain a chain that drives jobs, taxes, and local purchases
-
The Chamber approves a critical minerals policy with a R$2 billion fund and R$5 billion in tax incentives to try to transform lithium, rare earths, graphite, and nickel into a new economic frontier for Brazil.
-
Brazil could be throwing away a fortune in e-waste while it competes with the world for critical minerals and tries to map its largest urban mine.
In the case of rare earths, the stated goal is to expand suppliers outside of China, which concentrates 60% of global extraction and 90% of refining capacity.
The DFC’s entry into projects in Brazil occurs before any official agreement between governments on critical minerals.
This anticipation reduces Brazil’s negotiating margin regarding counterparties such as local processing, technology transfer, and industrial policy associated with Brazilian rare earths.
Serra Verde: US$ 465 Million to Expand Production in Goiás
According to Folha de S. Paulo, Serra Verde announced in November a loan of US$ 465 million (R$ 2.5 billion) from the DFC to enable the expansion of the mine in northern Goiás.
The contract has not been disclosed, and industry observers believe it is likely that there are commercial commitments tied to directing part of the production to the American market.
In an interview in early December with Reuters, the president of Serra Verde, Thras Moraitis, stated that the company restructured contracts with Chinese clients to allow part of the production to go to Western clients.
The key point is that the exported concentrate is a step prior to refining, with less added value than oxides and separated products.
Serra Verde plans to produce 5,000 tons of contained oxide in rare earths concentrate by early 2027 and reach 10,000 tons by 2030.
The DFC financing is described as the mechanism to accelerate this production curve in Goiás.
Aclara: US$ 5 Million, Feasibility Study, and Refinery Outside Brazil
Aclara closed a financing deal in September for US$ 5 million (R$ 27.05 million) with the DFC, also with the possibility of conversion to equity, to complete the feasibility study of its mine in northern Goiás.
In October, Aclara announced it will build a refinery in the United States by 2028 to separate the concentrate produced in Brazil.
According to the company, the refinery aims to meet over 75% of U.S. demand for heavy rare earth elements for electric vehicles by 2028.
Projected investments for the plant in the U.S. are US$ 277 million (R$ 1.5 billion), below the US$ 680 million (R$ 3.7 billion) projected for the project in Goiás.
In a statement, Aclara stated that the contract with the DFC does not guarantee future investments or imposes an obligation to direct production to U.S. buyers.
The practical divergence lies in the location of processing: processing outside the country reinforces the U.S. industrial position, even though the ore comes from Brazilian rare earths.
Refining is the Strategic Step and Today China Dominates
Currently, Chinese refineries and one in Malaysia are capable of separating rare earth elements at an industrial scale, a necessary step to obtain oxides used in the automotive and defense industries.
U.S. companies, with government support, are investing billions to create alternatives, and DFC financing acts as leverage to accelerate this movement.
For Brazil, the context is sensitive: the country holds the third-largest rare earth reserve in the world, behind China and Vietnam.
When refining happens abroad, a significant portion of the added value and industrial learning also leaves the reach of public policies and clusters in Goiás.
Brazilian Government Wants Local Processing and Negotiations Remain Open
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva indicated that generating added value in Brazil would be a condition for a possible agreement with the U.S. on critical minerals.
Brazilian authorities were in the U.S. in early December to discuss the issue, but there is no indication of an imminent agreement, according to the dynamics reported by interlocutors.
The Ministry of Mines and Energy stated that it maintains continuous dialogue with strategic partners about critical and strategic minerals.
A possible model mentioned in the debate is the agreement between the U.S. and Australia, signed in October, in which the Americans committed to invest US$ 8.5 billion in the processing of critical minerals in the Oceanian country.
What the U.S. Seeks Beyond Money and Why This Affects Bargaining
Experts consulted by those following the matter point out that to receive funding from the DFC, a company tends to accept clauses that ensure part of the production is directed to the United States.
Although the final wording may vary, the economic effect is to bring U.S. supply and demand closer before the bilateral table.
Executive Erasto Almeida of Safe assessed that agreements between governments are not essential for projects to advance, given that Brazilian mining is open to foreign investment.
On the American side, people involved in the matter stated that the Trump administration is interested in agreements that ensure priority for American companies in offers of critical minerals extracted in Brazil or in auctioned reserves, citing the agreement signed in early December with the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a reference.
The advancement of the DFC over Serra Verde and Aclara in Goiás changes the pace of the dispute over industrial chains of Brazilian rare earths by anticipating access to production and concentrating refining outside the country.
The decision left for Brazil is to transform reserve into industry before the commercial and technological advantage solidifies.
To keep track of the topic, monitor the upcoming announcements on capacity, licenses, and investments in processing in Brazil, as well as bilateral negotiations in 2026.
-
1 person reacted to this.