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Seven of the ten cut cables occurred in just two months between November 2024 and January 2025. The Chinese freighter Yi Peng 3 remains the focus of the Western investigation into underwater sabotage.
The Chinese freighter Yi Peng 3 is at the center of the European investigation into the cut cables in the Baltic. The incidents have reached the tenth since 2022, according to a survey published by the Atlantic Council.
According to the report, seven of these cuts occurred in just two months, between November 2024 and January 2025. The geographical and temporal concentration supports the hypothesis of a coordinated operation.
According to Wikipedia, on November 17 and 18, 2024, two cables were cut almost simultaneously. These were the BCS East-West Interlink and the C-Lion1, critical telecommunications infrastructure between Finland, Germany, and Lithuania.
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Yi Peng 3 and the Russian shadow fleet
According to the Lieber Institute, of the United States Military Academy at West Point, the Hong Kong-flagged freighter Yi Peng 3 was identified near the two severed cables.
In fact, European authorities believe the ship’s anchor caused the damage. On the other hand, there is no public conclusion yet on whether it was an accident or a deliberate act.
In parallel, NATO intelligence officials suspect that this vessel was operating under the influence of Russian intelligence. Consequently, the term “shadow fleet” has become standard jargon in specialized coverage.
According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Russian shadow fleet includes dozens of ships without clear identification that evade traditional sanctions.
Chronology: from the Chinese ship to other cuts in the Baltic
According to the Atlantic Council’s record, the incidents include the Estlink 2 cable, damaged in October 2023 between Finland and Estonia.
On December 25 and 26, 2024, three other cables suffered almost simultaneous damage, including EstLink 2 (second cut) and C-Lion1 (second cut).
In fact, in parallel, the Eagle S, flagged in the Cook Islands, was detained by Finland.
According to Elisa, the Finnish operator, on December 31, 2024, at 04:53 AM, there was a cut in the fiber optic cable connecting Helsinki to Tallinn, Estonia.
In fact, the last incident mapped by the Atlantic Council occurred in January 2025, closing the sequence of seven cuts in just over two months.
In turn, according to the Jackson School of the University of Washington, this pattern is unique in the modern history of underwater infrastructure.
Impact: telecommunications and data at risk
According to NATO, more than 95% of intercontinental communications pass through submarine cables. The Baltic has dozens of these routes.
In parallel, the cutting of a C-Lion1 cable reduces traffic capacity between Helsinki and Rostock by hours. Consequently, operators need to activate alternative routes at high cost.
According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the average repair time for a submarine cable is between two and five weeks. In parallel, the global fleet of repair ships has about 60 units.
In fact, this number does not cover all potential traffic in the event of coordinated sabotage. On the other hand, Nordic countries have increased military exercises in the region.
NATO Response: Baltic Sentry and maritime patrols
In January 2025, NATO launched the Baltic Sentry mission. According to the Atlantic Council, the operation includes surface ships, P-8 Poseidon aircraft, and maritime drones.
According to the Swedish Civil Defence, autonomous underwater drones monitor sections of the cable route. Consequently, any off-route approach generates an alert.
According to NATO, the objective is deterrence. In other words, visible military presence reduces attempts at new cuts.
In turn, Russia denies direct involvement. In comparison, Estonia formally accuses Moscow of coordinating the “shadow fleet” since 2023.
Cut cables in the Baltic in numbers
- 10 cables cut since 2022 in the Baltic Sea
- 7 cuts between November 2024 and January 2025
- 2 to 5 weeks average repair time
- 95% of intercontinental communications via submarine cables
- 60 repair ships in the global fleet
In comparison, before 2022, the Baltic recorded an average of one cable cut per year. The acceleration since 2022 is statistically and politically significant.
Other maritime discoveries and operations are linked to the same strategic theater. The new 150 MW Russian nuclear icebreaker serves the same strategy of controlling the Northern Sea Route.
And Brazil? How the country connects to Atlantic cables
Brazil has about 20 submarine telecommunications cables connected to its coast, according to Anatel. In parallel, most of Brazil’s international traffic passes through Fortaleza (CE) and Rio de Janeiro.
According to Anatel, the BRUSA cable connects Fortaleza to Virginia Beach (USA) with 10,500 km. Consequently, this cable is a key piece of Brazil-United States commercial traffic.
In comparison, robots also study the seabed for other purposes. See how 6-ton robots descend 5 km into the Pacific to aspirate rare minerals.
According to analysts, Brazil does not face the same sabotage scenario as the Baltic. On the other hand, the protection of Atlantic cables is a growing topic in Brasília.
In parallel, maritime defense experts warn that the next generation of cables will have ceramic shielding. According to MIT studies, this material reduces the risk of anchor cuts by up to 80%.
In fact, the installation cost doubles. Consequently, operators only implement this protection on strategic military routes.
According to the Lieber Institute, NATO is evaluating standardizing this protection for dual-use military-civilian cables by 2030. In turn, Sweden has already announced contracts for this type of shielding.
Caveat: investigation into cut cables in the Baltic remains open
According to European officials, there is no formal public attribution of the incidents to a specific state yet. In parallel, suspects such as the Chinese freighter and the Eagle S received little investigative cooperation.
In fact, the legal regime of international waters limits enforcement action. Consequently, Baltic countries are discussing changes to maritime law.
Does Brazil currently have a contingency plan for sabotage of Atlantic cables? The Baltic case shows that this risk is no longer hypothetical.
Still, Baltic Sentry maintains a reinforced military presence. Consequently, new cuts in 2026 would be interpreted as a direct provocation to NATO countries.
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