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The case of the Iranian ship Delruba, sanctioned by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) since 2018, which docked in October 2025 at the Santa Catarina Port Terminal (TESC), in São Francisco do Sul, with 60 thousand tons of urea valued at US$ 24.4 million, returned to the center of the debate on Brazil’s dependence on imported fertilizers. In May 2026, urea reached US$ 710 per ton in Brazilian ports, a 50% increase in 30 days, according to Itaú BBA Agribusiness, in a scenario aggravated by export restrictions from Russia and China and the effects of the Strait of Hormuz blockade.
The episode of the Iranian ship Delruba, which docked in Santa Catarina with 60 thousand tons of urea produced by Pardis Petrochemical, an Iranian state-owned company also sanctioned by OFAC, gained new relevance in May 2026 because the global fertilizer market entered an acute crisis. Urea, the main nitrogenous fertilizer used in Brazilian agribusiness, soared 50% in 30 days and reached US$ 710 per ton in Brazil‘s ports, according to Itaú BBA Agribusiness. The scenario exposes a vulnerability that the docking of the Delruba already signaled: Brazil imports about 85% of the fertilizers it consumes and depends on suppliers such as Russia, China, and Iran.
The crisis is not abstract: it directly affects the cost of planting soybeans, corn, and coffee in the next semester. Russia, which accounted for 25.9% of Brazilian chemical product imports in 2025, according to MDIC, temporarily suspended ammonium nitrate exports. China restricted sales of phosphatic fertilizers, with up to 40 million tons under blockade or strict quotas, according to Reuters. And the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s oil and a significant portion of Iranian fertilizers transit, was blocked between February 28 and May 6, 2026, when it was reopened to commercial navigation by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy.
What happened to the Delruba ship in October 2025
The Delruba docked at TESC berths in São Francisco do Sul on October 4, 2025, and completed unloading on October 8. The cargo of 60 thousand tons of granular urea, valued at US$ 24.4 million (about R$ 130.6 million at the exchange rate at the time), was produced by Pardis Petrochemical, a subsidiary of the National Petrochemical Company, linked to Iran’s Ministry of Oil. Both the ship and the manufacturer are on OFAC‘s sanctions list, according to Gazeta do Povo.
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The import was carried out by Link Comercial, a Brazilian company, with the intermediation of Eastoil Petroleum Products LLC, based in the United Arab Emirates. According to a source from the port complex under anonymity, cited by Metrópoles, the operation was authorized by the Brazilian Navy, Anvisa, and Federal Police, with the support of the Federal Government, which stated there was no impediment for Iranian vessels to dock in Brazilian ports. The State Government of Santa Catarina confirmed the operation and the values involved, according to Gazeta do Povo.
The risk of secondary sanctions for Brazil
The legal issue of the Delruba case goes beyond the docking itself. OFAC issued an alert on May 1, 2026 that entities dealing with sanctioned Iranian state-owned companies may face secondary sanctions, a mechanism that allows the U.S. to punish companies, banks, and even governments of third countries that do business with listed targets. In practice, this means that Link Comercial, the banks that processed the transaction, and the port itself could be included in American restrictive lists.
For Brazil, which depends on the dollar-denominated international financial system, secondary sanctions represent a concrete operational risk. Brazilian banks that process payments for Iranian fertilizers may lose access to the dollar clearing system, a scenario that no financial institution voluntarily accepts. This is the dilemma that the Delruba case illustrates: Brazil needs Iranian urea to feed its agribusiness, but buying it through sanctioned channels could cost more than the price of the fertilizer.
The surge in urea and what is pushing prices
The price of urea in Brazilian ports jumped from around US$ 470 to US$ 710 per ton in 30 days, a 50% increase that Itaú BBA Agribusiness attributes to the combination of three simultaneous factors. The first is tension in the Middle East: Iran is a major producer of nitrogen fertilizers, and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz between February and May interrupted the flow of ships transporting urea and other derivatives of Iranian natural gas.
The second factor is restrictions from Russia and China. Russia temporarily suspended ammonium nitrate exports to prioritize the domestic market, with shipments expected to resume in May. China restricted sales of phosphate fertilizers, with release only expected in August, according to Reuters. The third factor is freight: route diversions due to conflicts in the Red Sea added up to 15 days of travel to each shipment, increasing the final cost of the product arriving in Brazil.
The Brazilian dependence that the crisis laid bare
The numbers of dependence are known, but the crisis makes them urgent. Brazil imports about 85% of the fertilizers it consumes, according to the National Fertilizer Plan (PNF). Russia was responsible for 25.9% of Brazilian chemical product imports in 2025, according to MDIC data. China is the third largest overall supplier, and Iran is the third largest specific supplier of urea. Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria complete the picture of dependence.
Senator Tereza Cristina (PL-SP), former Minister of Agriculture and author of the PNF, warned in an interview with Gazeta do Povo: “Today we are repeating 2022, but worse, with a risk of rising prices.” Technical notes from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Mapa) point to “extremely high risk” for the fertilizer sector, with the threat of rising domestic prices and even shortages in the harvest to be planted in the second half of 2026. The PNF, launched in 2022 with the goal of reducing external dependence to 45% to 50% by 2050, has made insufficient progress in its first years.
The expensive natural gas that prevents Brazil from producing its own urea
The root of Brazil’s dependence on imported urea lies in the cost of natural gas. In Brazil, gas reaches fertilizer factories at up to US$ 14 per million BTU, while in the US and Russia, the same input costs between US$ 2 and US$ 4, according to Anda (National Association for the Diffusion of Fertilizers). Since natural gas is the main raw material for urea and all nitrogen fertilizers, this cost difference makes national production up to four times more expensive than imports under normal market conditions.
Petrobras is trying to change this equation. The state-owned company resumed urea production at Fafen-SE (December/2025), Fafen-BA (January/2026), and Ansa (April/2026, with an investment of R$ 870 million and a capacity of 720 thousand tons per year), and resumed works on UFN-III in Três Lagoas (MS) with expected operation in 2029. The combined goal is to reach 35% of the national urea market after UFN-III, reducing dependence but not eliminating it. The connection with pre-salt gas is the long-term bet, but competitive cost still depends on regulation and transport infrastructure.
What to expect from the next harvest and why the Delruba case matters
The Delruba case matters because it illustrates the dead end in which Brazil finds itself. Without sufficient internal urea production, the country is forced to import from suppliers operating in conflict zones or under international sanctions, accepting logistical, diplomatic, and financial risks that would be unacceptable in normal times. The docking of a sanctioned ship in a Brazilian port is not an isolated incident: it is a symptom of a fertilizer policy that prioritized external dependence for decades.
For the 2026/27 harvest, the threat is concrete. Russian shipments are expected to resume in May, but Chinese shipments are only expected to return in August, a period that coincides with the start of soybean planting in the Midwest. If urea remains above US$700 per ton, the cost of agricultural production rises proportionally, squeezing the margins of producers who already operate with tight profitability. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz on May 6 is a partial relief, but the structural crisis remains intact.
Do you think Brazil should buy urea from sanctioned ships to supply agribusiness, or should it invest more to produce internally even if it costs more? Tell us in the comments if the 85% dependence on imported fertilizers worries you and what you think about Petrobras resuming urea production.
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