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In the midst of the Cold War, Brazil and West Germany signed a monumental nuclear agreement. It promised energy independence to Brazil, but raised the world's alarm about a possible arms race and a “secret plan” for the atomic bomb.
On June 27, 1975, Brazil, under military rule, and West Germany signed the ambitious Brazil-Germany nuclear agreement. Dubbed the “Deal of the Century,” the pact provided for the construction of eight nuclear power plants and the transfer of technology for the complete nuclear fuel cycle. Signed against a backdrop of energy crisis and Cold War tensions, the agreement fueled Brazil’s dreams of technological autonomy and power status.
However, it generated strong international opposition, especially from the USA, which feared the proliferation of weapons and the possible manufacture of a Brazilian atomic bomb, a suspicion fueled by a parallel nuclear program secretly conducted by the Armed Forces.
Why did Brazil seek a nuclear agreement with Germany in the midst of the Cold War?
In the 1970s, Brazil was experiencing what was known as an “economic miracle.” However, the 1973 oil crisis exposed its great energy vulnerability. The search for alternatives became urgent. The military regime saw the mastery of nuclear technology as an opportunity to guarantee energy security. In addition, it aimed to boost technological development. The goal was to establish Brazil as an emerging power.
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Distrust of the United States as a nuclear supplier was also growing. In 1974, the US suspended new contracts for the supply of enriched uranium. Brazil, which had opposed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since 1968, considering it discriminatory, saw the American decision as an attempt to curb its program. This situation led the government of General Ernesto Geisel to seek a new partner. West Germany emerged as the nation willing to transfer the complete fuel cycle technology, promising the long-awaited independence.
8 plants, full fuel cycle and controversial German technology
O Brazil-Germany nuclear agreement was vast. It envisaged the construction of eight PWR nuclear power plants, each with about 1.300 MW. The first would be Angra II and Angra III. The most crucial and controversial point was the transfer of technology for the complete fuel cycle. This included uranium prospecting and mining, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor operation and the sensitive reprocessing of spent fuel, which allows the extraction of plutonium.
The state-owned Nuclebrás would coordinate the Brazilian side. Germany’s Kraftwerk Union (KWU), owned by Siemens, would lead the German consortium. Binational companies would be created, such as NUCLEP, to manufacture heavy components. However, one technological choice generated great controversy: the “jet-nozzle” enrichment method. Under pressure from the US, Germany offered this experimental, energy-intensive and industrially unproven technology instead of the more efficient ultracentrifugation. Brazil accepted, assuming a considerable technological risk.
US's fierce opposition to Brazil-Germany nuclear deal
The signature of Brazil-Germany nuclear agreement caused strong international repercussions. The United States led the opposition. Washington feared that Brazil, a non-signatory to the NPT, would use the technology to develop nuclear weapons. The transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies was seen as an unacceptable risk.
The Ford administration (1974-1977) attempted an initial diplomatic approach. The Carter administration (1977-1981) intensified the pressure. Carter openly criticized the agreement and used human rights arguments to pressure Brazil. Bilateral relations deteriorated, culminating in the cancellation of the Brazil-US military agreement in 1977. American opposition also had an economic component, challenging the dominance of its companies in the nuclear market.
In response to the 1974 Indian nuclear test and the Brazil-Germany agreement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was strengthened, imposing stricter guidelines for nuclear exports, making implementation of the pact more difficult. Argentina, a regional rival with its own nuclear program, looked on with suspicion, heightening the perception of a South American nuclear arms race.
Brazil's parallel nuclear program and military intentions
Enquanto or Brazil-Germany nuclear agreement faced obstacles, a clandestine program gained strength: the Autonomous Nuclear Technology Program (PATN), or “parallel program”. Formally initiated in 1979, but with earlier roots, it responded to frustrations with the official agreement. The unfeasibility of the “jet-nozzle”, the slowness and the increasing costs of the pact with Germany motivated this secret route.
Controlled by the military and outside the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the PATN sought unrestricted autonomy in the fuel cycle. Its objectives included naval nuclear propulsion and, potentially, the ability to produce nuclear explosives. The Navy focused on ultracentrifugation (Project Ciclone), the Air Force on laser enrichment (Project Solimões), and the Army on the production of nuclear graphite and plutonium reactors (Project Atlântico).
The discovery in 1986 of a test well in Serra do Cachimbo (PA) confirmed the broader intentions. The symbolic closure of this well in 1990 marked the official end of activities with potential for war. The parallel program was not a “secret plan” in of the German agreement, but a distinct and autonomous path.
The controversial legacy of the Brazil-Germany nuclear deal
The implementation of Brazil-Germany nuclear agreement fell far short of what was planned. The jet-nozzle technology failed industrially. Costs soared amid the Brazilian economic crisis of the 80s. International pressure and domestic criticism undermined the program. Of the eight reactors, only Angra II (which began operations in 2001) and Angra III (still unfinished) were started. Plans for enrichment and reprocessing plants under the agreement were abandoned.
Despite the partial collapse, the legacy is complex. NUCLEP, created to manufacture heavy components, became an important technology hub, including for the Navy’s submarine program. Crucially, the mastery of uranium enrichment by ultracentrifugation came not from the German agreement, but from the parallel program.
Paradoxically, the difficulties of the official agreement and the existence of the parallel program led Brazil, after redemocratization and in cooperation with Argentina (with the creation of ABACC), to fully adhere to the non-proliferation regime, including the NPT in 1998. Brazil-Germany nuclear agreement illustrates the challenges of sensitive technology transfer and the intricate relationships between national ambition, global pressures, and technical and economic realities.
