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GPS spoofing can make a vehicle appear to be on its normal route while cargo and actual location are diverted. Technology created at Oak Ridge National Laboratory identifies false signals in real-time, even when in motion, and seeks to reinforce transport security.
A portable detector created at the U.S. Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory can recognize GPS spoofing in real-time, even when in motion. The technology was developed to protect transportation systems against the manipulation of satellite signals used to provide location and time information.
The team was led by Austin Albright, responsible for inventing a system described as highly sensitive and portable. The goal is to identify when false signals mimic real GPS transmissions and generate incorrect information about position, time, or both.
GPS spoofing is different from GPS jamming. While jamming drowns out legitimate signals with noise and makes it clear that there is interference, spoofing can maintain the appearance of normal operation while leading tracking systems to false data.
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Technology works without relying on a GPS receiver
ORNL’s technology detects spoofing of location, time, and data. It works even when the attacker spoofs all satellite signals or just some, and also operates in moving situations.
The detector’s differential lies in its ability to distinguish GPS spoofing even when false and real signals have the same strength. This functionality does not appear in other known systems, which places the equipment in an unusual position in combating this type of attack.
The system operates independently, without a GPS receiver and without prior knowledge of available signals. To do this, it uses software-defined radio, a mathematical method applied directly to received radio frequencies, and an embedded graphics unit to perform calculations in real-time.
Tests surpassed industry-developed systems
The detector was created by a multidisciplinary team with experts in sensors, radio frequency signals, mathematics, computing, electronics, and national security. At a U.S. Department of Homeland Security testing event, the technology outperformed industry-developed systems.
Commercial products can already reduce the effects of GPS jamming, but reliable detection of GPS spoofing remained a challenge. The ORNL team seeks to adapt the design to make it more accessible, while preserving the ability to identify attacks under varied conditions.
Albright argues that the road transport sector needs a solution that works without special conditions and without relying on a reliable reference source. This independence is central for applications involving GPS-monitored cargo during long journeys.
Crime uses false signals to hide diversions
ORNL researchers began studying GPS interference due to the increase in criminal cases and records made by independent trackers. Independent websites track thousands of jamming episodes in aircraft and hundreds of daily spoofing cases.
International criminal networks have already adopted GPS spoofing to steal loaded trucks on long-distance journeys. In a recent and widely reported case, thieves used the technique to hijack all shipments of a special tequila linked to the company founded by chef Guy Fieri and former Van Halen frontman, Sammy Hagar.
The concern ranges from personal packages to nuclear materials. When there is jamming, the delivery disappears from tracking and the problem becomes evident; with spoofing, everything can seem secure while the cargo takes another route.
Early warning aims at transport security
Cargo thefts can affect prices and jobs, but the greater risk involves the diversion of dangerous or critical items. Examples cited include handguns, pharmaceuticals, and radioactive materials, which can deviate from their intended destination and reach the wrong people.
Albright works to raise awareness of these risks with transportation security organizations. He also helps the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers develop an international standard to certify resilience in global positioning, navigation, and timing equipment.
Since the trucking industry does not yet have real-time indicators for spoofing, Albright plans research to identify and characterize the baseline threat level to the industry. The goal is to enable drivers to quickly detect GPS spoofing, call for help, and respond to an invisible threat before the deviation progresses.
Click here to access the study.
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